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Abstract 
This paper develops the concept of “interface structures” to refer to an emerging type 
of organisation to promote and increase interactions between different elements of an 
innovation system, especially between research establishments and potential users of 
their capabilities. We identify similarities in the strategies adopted by organisations 
involved in knowledge transfer in two different countries and contexts, but facing a 
similar problem: the need to bridge dissimilar organisational cultures and practices. 
Without any contact among them, these organisations have developed remarkably 
similar and innovative strategies.  
Background: defining and characterising interface structures 
The development of innovation systems approaches is closely connected with policy 
practice. Policy agencies in Scandinavian countries played an important role in their 
early development (Carlsson 2002). Later, the OECD contributed to the development 
of the approach and its diffusion among academics and policy-makers (Godin, 2004). 
Our paper is also rooted in practice. Based on the applied experience of existing 
organisations, our paper will define and characterise a new type of structure within an 
innovation system.  
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Innovation systems approaches focus the attention of policy makers on the existence 
of situations where the relationships between different actors in the system are weak, 
and where divergent cultural traits and organisational practices pose a barrier to the 
collaboration and coordination among different actors in a system. There has been 
abundant research about the study of these relationships, especially in areas like 
university-industry linkages where cultural differences and other barriers have 
hampered a fluid relationship between the universities and their economic 
environment (Agrawal, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carayol, 2003). 
This literature is often normative, proposing policy instruments to overcome barriers 
and strengthen the interconnectedness of the system. Yet it usually take as its subject 
the problems emerging in countries where there is both an advanced research and 
industrial infrastructures. Here cultural differences, managerial difficulties, divergent 
interests, all pose barriers to technology transfer and other forms of relationship, but 
there is an assumption that, in the absence of these barriers, potential technology 
customer would be able to articulate a demand that could then be serviced by public 
research organisations. If some difficulties are overcome and enough information is 
available then relationships will develop 
The problems we address in this paper are even more complex. We focus on 
situations in which, in addition, there is a lack of awareness of what oneself and the 
other relevant actors in the system can offer or require. In other words, we address 
parts of the system in which the actors “don´t know what they don´t know”. To 
respond to this situation, policy practitioners in different contexts have devised 
remarkably similar responses, which have an organisational rather than a purely 
instrumental nature. They have developed what we have defined elsewhere as 
“interface structures” (Fernández de Lucio et al.., 1996). This paper develops this 
notion. 
The objective of an interface structure is to act as a promoter and catalyst of the 
relationships between different actors in the system, reducing the barriers that have 
made it difficult for them to establish long-term relationships, but without becoming 
directly involved in the innovation process itself. The paper will show that these 
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interface structure have much broader roles than those typically attributed to the much 
studied technology transfer organisations.  
Based on case studies of two different experiences we define the concept of “interface 
structure”, identify its role and characteristics (networked structure, broad portfolio of 
activities,…), and their role supporting the relationships among different system 
actors. The paper presents the case studies of a network of University-Industry 
technology transfer organisations set up in Spain in the late 1980s (OTRI Network), 
and an organisation set up in the United Kingdom to improve the relationship between 
defence research capacities and needs and their commercial environment (the Defence 
Diversification Agency). After the case studies we draw some common traits that 
bring together these initiatives originating in such different contexts, and based on 
these traits we develop the concept of Interface Structure. We conclude by placing 
this context within a systemic view of innovation. 
The OTRI Network and University-Industry technology transfer in Spain 
Background 
During the mid 1980s the Spanish innovation system was being rapidly transformed. 
Spain was emerging from almost 40 years of military dictatorship (a new democratic 
Constitution was approved in 1978) with a model of economic development that has 
sometimes been described as “dependent”: research was virtually non-existent, and 
the little that was done was often carried out in large government research 
organisations with weak linkages to their socio-economic environment. In the mid 
1980s a whole set of legal initiatives was enacted attempting to develop new research 
and innovation capacities (University Reform Act –1983-, Act for the Promotion and 
Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research, usually referred to as the “Science 
Act –1986-, and a new Patent Act –1986). Linked to them the First National R&D 
plan was launched in 1988. Until then, Universities had carried out very little 
research, typically funded through their own resources. Also, until the University 
Reform Act, it was illegal for Universities to obtain resources additional to their 
normal budgets by entering, for instance, into contractual agreements with firms and 
other organisations. The only linkage between Universities and firms was organised 
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through 4 “University-Enterprise Foundations” that had been created during the 70s 
and early 80s, to manage the contracts that research groups from a few universities 
might have obtained through their own initiative. 
The situation in the government research establishments had been marginally better. 
The Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), the main research establishment 
in the country, had several applied research institutes with a tradition of collaboration 
with industry, although paradoxically, this had weakened substantially since the 1950s 
(López García, 1999). In the mid 1980s CSIC launched several initiatives to promote 
collaboration with industry, like the creation of a technology transfer office (1985), 
and the launch of cooperative programme (PECOS) (Fernández de Lucio, 1988). 
On the demand side, the Spanish development model had been based on cheap labour 
and energy costs, foreign investment and foreign technology (García Delgado, 1995). 
During the 1960s and 1970s Spanish firms carried out virtually no R&D: in 1964 
Spanish firms spent 0.03% of GDP, a percentage that, by 1984 had grown to a less 
than modest 0.18%. The lack of formal research activities was accompanied by the 
low educational level of Spanish industrial labour force: by 1984 only 2% of 
industrial employees had a university degree (Más et all., 2004). 
Within this context, policy-makers were aware of the need to support the 
collaboration between public research organisations and industry. The managers of 
the National Research Plan were asked to support a relationship that had been, until 
then, non-existent. Rather than supporting University-Industry collaboration, science 
policy managers were put in the difficult job of creating it.  
The OTRI Network: genesis and main characteristics 
The creation of technology transfer offices in Spanish universities was a “top-down” 
policy initiative. In 1989 the managers of the National R&D Plan, included among 
their activities the setting up of Offices for the Transfer of Research Results (OTRIs) 
in all Spanish universities. The OTRI´s were originally designed with, among others, 
the following objectives (CICYT 1988): 
• To identify capacities and results with potential non-academic applications 
generated by research groups  
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• To facilitate the transfer of research results from the research groups to 
industry and other users 
• To support researchers when entering contractual negotiations with firms and 
other clients and help them manage research contracts and to help  them 
protect  their Intellectual Property with the appropriate legal tools 
• To provide researchers with information on opportunities available through 
European programmes and help them develop research projects 
These were all areas in which Spanish universities and research centres had little if 
any experience. The OTRIs´ main goal was to facilitate University-Industry 
collaboration, but they had a broad set of objectives. For instance the managers of the 
Spanish National R&D Plan used the OTRIs as conveyors of information to the 
academic community, and relied on them to disseminate information and support the 
access to the different policy instruments in support of University-Industry relations 
that they would develop and implement over the years. 
Importantly, the OTRIs were set up as a network co-ordinated and supported by a 
central unit (the Office of Technology Transfer –OTT) within the National Plan 
Secretariat (Castro et al., 1991; Fernández de Lucio et al., 1996).1 The role of this 
central co-ordination was paramount. The OTRIs themselves were very small units, 
intended to be close to their local research capacities (mainly in the universities) and 
local needs. Yet, for this same reason, they lacked, specialised capacities and, 
importantly, experience. The central OTT coordinated activities, facilitated the 
exchange of information and experiences, and provided, among other services, 
management training in areas like Intellectual Property, and the dissemination of 
information on research opportunities. 
As the OTRIs themselves gained capacity and experience the central support role of 
the OTT diminished in importance, and the Office was formally closed in the late 
1990s. However, the OTRIs continued to work as a network. In 1997 the Vice-
 
1 The arrangement was called OTRI Network/OTT. 
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Chancellors of all Spanish universities formally created the OTRI Network, which 
continues to organise training, establish working groups, and develop other activities 
typically oriented towards training and the dissemination of good practice.  
All Spanish Universities and the Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) 
joined the initiative and set up their OTRIs. Similarly, all newly created universities 
have, since their establishment, set up OTRIs affiliated to the network. The outcome 
of this process was the establishment of a geographically distributed network of small 
units, displaying close links with and detailed knowledge of their local environments.2  
The emergence of a network of small units was not an accident, but was designed into 
the policy initiative. An OTRI would have two or three employees, which would 
operate as generalists without a clear definition of their functions, supported by an 
administrative post. Their main role was to stimulate the relationships between 
industry and academia, on the one hand encouraging academic researchers to get 
involved in work with industrial partners by offering information and personalised 
support, while, on the other hand, providing information to the industrial community 
about the capabilities available in academic research centres and universities. In this 
way, the OTRI played the role of a facilitator, rather than that of a technology broker, 
trying to support the creation of a market for research services and outputs where 
none existed. Spanish academics had developed an inward-looking culture, oriented 
towards teaching, less concerned by research, and without any interest in technology 
transfer activities. Within this context, the OTRI had to operate as a client-oriented 
service, avoiding the bureaucratic and legalistic approaches that are still today 
characteristic of universities and research establishments’ administrations.  
Given the distributed nature of the OTRI network, not all OTRIs developed following 
exactly the same model. Some developed more rapidly, particularly those situated 
within universities with applied research capacities, and where groups of lecturers 
became rapidly involved and increasingly experienced in establishing contractual 
 
2 Our previous research has shown how, in fact, all OTRIs have established collaborative links with 
firms from their specific regions (Castro et all., 2005). 
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relationships with the private sector. Often, OTRIs had to take over managerial 
functions for which they had not been originally intended, as the central university 
services proved unable to administer research contracts and programs. In these cases 
the OTRIs became overwhelmed with administrative tasks and found it difficult to 
engage in the functions for which they had been originally intended.  
Outcomes 
Whatever the difficulties experienced by specific OTRIs, there can be little doubt that 
they play an important role in the major change that Spanish universities were to 
experience in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, according to OECD data, 
the share of universities’ R&D funded by firms grew from 0.4% in 1981 to 8% in 
2002, superior to the OECD average (OECD, 2004). This might be attributed to 
causes other than the emergence of these offices; yet the table below shows how 
several indicators of OTRI activity and outcomes have grown rapidly, suggesting an 
important role in drawing public research funds to universities. Even when the main 
goal of the offices was not the generation of research contracts but to establish links 
and generate mutual interest between two hitherto separated communities, they 
managed an increasingly large number of contracts generating substantial resources. 
Table 1 University OTRIs: activity and output indicators 
 1989 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of universities 32 48 57 57 58 58
Professional staff  (FTE) 64 154 179 234 294 348
Number of R&D contracts  695 3.270 8.687 8.323 7.958 9.830
Income from R&D contracts (M€) 8 120 218 252 258 282
Number of national patent 
applications 24 140 264 301 317 307
Number of international patent 
extensions   43 66 107 93
Number of options and license 
contracts   50 53 78 143
Income from licenses (M€)   0,49 1,14 1,69 1,9
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New spin offs created   39 65 87 90
Sources: Own elaboration of CICYT annual reports (1989 and 1995) and University’s OTRI 
Network annual surveys (2001-2004) 
 
The amount and value of R&D contracts managed have recently stabilised after a 
protracted period of rapid growth, reflecting probably that the community of 
university researchers that were receptive to the OTRIs “message” and capable of 
engaging in contractual research relationships with external partners has been reached 
in its totality, and that the growth generated by the creation of new universities and 
the hiring of young academics has stopped. Recently the OTRIs have been involved in 
supporting new transfer tools like the creation of spin-off firms in science-based 
sectors. This is a new avenue likely to require further cultural and legal changes. 
The UK Defence Diversification Agency and military-civilian technology 
transfer 
Background: commercialisation and the government defence labs 
The creation of the UK Defence Diversification Agency (DDA) is linked to the 
process of commercialisation in UK defence research establishments, which is, in 
turn, part of a series of reforms in government research establishments implemented 
mainly during the 1980s and 1990s. Policy measures seeking to obtain more “value-
for-money” from government research investments introduced greater accountability 
and a growing commercialisation of the relationship with Government users. In the 
defence area, most of the previously independent establishment were progressively 
merged into the Defence Research Agency (1991) and the Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency –DERA- (1995), which committed to seek maximum wealth 
creation from its research activities. As executive agencies of the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), these organisations gained the flexibility to become more commercial in their 
operations resulting in significant growth in DERA’s external income and the 
development of a more entrepreneurial culture among its scientific and technical staff 
 
SPRU´s 40th Anniversary Conference 
The Future of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy: Linking Research & 
Practice  
9 
                                                
(Arthur D. Little 2000). 3 Later most of DERA was turn into a new firm (QinetiQ) 
which is now being floated in the stock market. 
The creation of the DDA is related to this process. The Labour Party administration 
set up the DDA to address three priorities: 
• To encourage the widest possible exploitation of military technology by 
civilian firms 
• To encourage a growing variety of defence suppliers  
• To encourage the transfer of suitable civil technology into military 
programmes. 
To these ends the DDA was tasked with encouraging access to government defence 
labs, providing information about the capabilities they had available, stimulating 
transfer of MoD’s Intellectual Property Rights, seeking partnership with companies 
for programmes of co-development and adaptation, and providing information about 
future equipment needs and technological trends to potential new suppliers. 
Therefore, the objectives laid out for the DDA considered the transfer of technology 
from military to civilian applications, and vice versa. Initially, the model implicit in 
the description of DDAs tasks was linear: potential technology users in the civilian 
industry would be made aware of the technology offerings from DERA, or of 
opportunities in the defence markets. The possibility of more interactive collaboration 
through the engagement in programmes of co-development and technology adaptation 
was mentioned but it did not feature prominently; instead there was a focus on 
providing information through, for instance, databases of technological capabilities to 
which it was expected civilian firms would respond. The proposal could be seen as a 
continuation of other attempts at organising and stimulating technology transfer from 
the defence research establishments that had been tried with little success during the 
 
3 Yet, DERA’s main function remained to support the needs of the Ministry of Defence. 
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1980s and early 1990s.4 As we will see below the model that was eventually 
implemented diverted from this initial sketch. 
Implementation: The DDA 
The Defence Diversification Agency (DDA) was established in 1998 and began its 
first year of operation with a budget of £2 million. During its first year of operation 
the DDA created of a network of support activities and personnel across the country. 
It was set up with a small centre and, initially, five regional offices. With an original 
remit of promoting technology spill-overs between the defence and civilian sectors, 
the challenge facing the fledgling organisation was to establish mechanisms able to 
deal with a large variety of technological fields and industrial sectors. The defence 
research establishments had developed technological capabilities across a broad range 
of generic technologies with potential applications in many sectors, and the range of 
civilian technologies applicable to defence systems were not limited to any specific 
sector. Unlike other technology transfer organisations, which typically focused on a 
relatively narrow range of technologies and sectors, the DDA had to develop activities 
covering virtually all technological sectors.  
Further there was no tradition among civilian firms of access to defence research 
capacities. The latter had developed in a closed environment, and there was a 
widespread belief outside defence circles, that their activities were very specialised 
and irrelevant to civilian needs. Further, the highly publicised and recurrent scandals 
in the industry involving time and cost overruns, and dubious export practices 
involving the payment of bribes and other “sweeteners” to potential customers, had 
built an image of the defence industries as inefficient and stuck to outmoded 
managerial practices.  
 
4 For instance, for the failed experience in the late 1980s with the creation of an independent 
technology broker to commercialise defence technology (Defence Technology Enterprises) see 
Spinardi (1992). A detailed analysis of another, more successful experience with more sophisticated 
models of technology transfer see Molas-Gallart and Sinclair (1999) analysis of the Dual-Use 
Technology Centres. 
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This situation created substantial challenges. First, there was not a market “out there” 
waiting to access the capacities that the defence labs had to offer; on the contrary a 
customer base had to be built virtually from scratch. To do so, the DDA established a 
network of regional representatives (Technology Diversification Managers –TDM) 
working in close collaboration with the local “Regional Development Authorities”,5 
and other local organisations including the government-funded “Business Links”. By 
2004 the DDA was working from 26 different locations, each with at least one 
“Technology Diversification Manager” (TDM). The TDM’s objective was to be close 
to the local needs and to establish links with firms and organisations that could, in 
principle, be interested in working with the defence labs or for the defence agencies. 
The second problem was how to identify potential partners operating in different 
sectors with very limited availability of resources. Often, the technological 
requirements of a firm would not have been articulated; how can one then identify 
possible fields for technological co-operation when we do not know what a potential 
partner would need? To address this problem, the DDA developed a portfolio of tools 
to carry out technology audits of firms, and identify possible technology 
requirements. The TDMs apply these tools free of charge to selected firms. The 
Regional Development Authorities and the TDMs identify firms that, for their 
characteristics, may benefit from the technology offerings available at the defence 
labs, and offer them a technology audit for free. If firms want to pursue the 
opportunities identified through the audit the DDA will facilitate contacts and a 
further exploratory analysis with scientists and technicians from the defence research 
establishments. The DDA will usually step aside from the process once these contact 
have been established and the future partners start moving towards the signature of 
contractual agreements. 
The main DDA stakeholder, the UK Ministry of Defence soon focused its attention on 
another of the DDA’s original objectives: the identification of civilian technologies of 
interest to military applications. Driven by the growing importance of civilian-led IT 
 
5 The Regional Development Authorities are government-funded agencies whose main task is the 
promotion of regional economic development. 
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for military applications, the problem here is not only how to find relevant 
technological capabilities among civilian suppliers, but how to insert them in time 
into new weapons systems. The distributed network of TDMs has also helped in the 
identification of local capabilities that could be of interest to defence production. 
Outcomes 
Since its creation the DDA has grown to reach a total staff of 60, distributed between 
the central offices and a regional network of 26 TDMs. It has generated a large 
number of collaborations between firms and the defence research laboratories, and has 
introduced many commercial firms to defence markets. Since its establishment the 
DDA has advised technology transfer contracts with a direct value of £17 million. In 
2004, for instance, it placed 18 contracts between firms that had so far focused on 
civilian markets and the Ministry of Defence, and helped brokering 104 technology 
transfer contracts. Yet, it would be misleading to assess the outcomes of DDA’s work 
by using the type of indicators that have been applied to traditional technology 
brokers. Brokering technology transfer deals is not the focus of DDA’s activity. The 
flexible approach to the identification of technological opportunities implemented by 
the DDA has led to a broad variety of initiatives including, among others: 
o Technology and knowledge brokering - Matching the technological needs of 
commercial firms with the capabilities existing at the defence research 
laboratories). At times this will result in the licensing of specific technologies, 
but, more often, the defence research establishments will provide technology 
services, mainly the testing and evaluation of new technologies and products. 
This activity revolves around the implementation of technology audits in 
SMEs. Currently the DDA carries out about 160 audits each year. 
o Marketing assistance - Identifying potential new suppliers of advanced 
technologies to the UK Ministry of Defence.  
o Regeneration activities. The DDA has, for instance, contributed to the 
development of an under-used military airfield into a specialist test and 
evaluation centre for both military and civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 
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o Managing incubators. The Farnborough Entreprise Hub and the London 
Business Innovation Centre are two examples of incubators managed by the 
DDA and supported by a group of regional and local authorities  
o Dissemination - Participating in and organising events to present networking 
opportunities, introduce the procurement needs and practices of the MoD, 
discuss financing mechanisms for new companies and products, and explain 
Intellectual Property protection and evaluation practices. These activities are 
typically oriented to SMEs. 
o Development and implementation of knowledge and technology management 
tools. In addition to its own technology audit methodology, the DDA is 
developing, together with a British SME, a software tool to quantify the effect 
of technology and knowledge transfer. 
o Project evaluation. The DDA has helped the Welsh Knowledge Exploitation 
Fund develop a process for the evaluation of research proposals, identifying 
scientists from defence laboratories able to provide technical and scientific 
appraisals of the proposals.  
This is a broad set of activities spreading over a broad variety of industrial sectors, 
technologies, and regions. Examples of technologies that, having been first developed 
for a military use, have been developed into civilian applications with the help of the 
DDA cover virtually all industrial sectors, including electronics, health, renewable 
energies, transport, industrial coatings, monitoring services, etc.  
Analysis: towards “Interface Structures” 
Although they emerge from very different contexts and address different 
communities, the OTRI Network and the DDA experience share interesting 
commonalities. In both cases the problem they faced is to create a relationship 
between actors that did not have a tradition of collaboration. In Spain, there had 
hardly been any relationship between universities and industry prior to the creation of 
the OTRI Network. In the UK, civilian firms, particularly SMEs had no experience of 
collaborating with defence research laboratories. In both cases, the parties were 
unaware of each others’ capabilities and needs, and no “market” for technology or 
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technology services existed. It is our hypothesis that under these circumstances 
traditional “technology broker” functions oriented towards technology 
commercialisation will not be adequate.  
What is remarkable about the experience of the OTRI Network and the DDA is that 
without any previous knowledge of each other they developed a similar approach, 
which translates into a different kind of organisation we call Interface Structure. We 
use this term to refer to organisations set up by one or more agents to promote and 
facilitate relationships in all matters related to innovation between different actors of 
an innovation system (Fernández de Lucio, Conesa et al. 1996). Interface Structures 
have a set of distinctive and common characteristics: 
“Catalyst role” In chemistry a catalyst helps two other elements to interact in a 
chemical reaction, which would not occur in the absence of the catalyst. The catalyst 
however does not participate in the reaction, a good catalyst is the one that does not 
spend itself in it. This is a good analogy with the role of the “interface structures” we 
are analysing here. Their role is to put in touch two actors that would not otherwise 
interact, and assist to reach any agreement to take the relationship further. Interface 
structures inject a new “dynamic” into the innovation system, making its actors 
increasingly aware of opportunities in other parts of the system, and more active 
through the establishment of new relationships, without the interface structure itself 
getting directly involved in these new relations. The OTRIs may participate in 
licensing and other contractual agreements, but only as a further service they offer to 
their “customers” in universities and research establishments. Their strategy can be 
considered “mixed”, having both commercialisation and catalyst roles, but with the 
latter usually dominating. The DDA case is even clearer in this respect: it does not get 
involved in technology commercialisation activities: its practice is to step aside once 
two groups start “talking business”. In this respect, it cannot be more different from a 
technology broker, which derives its income and main “raison d’etre” from licensing 
deals and other commercialisation practices.  
Decentralised and networked. To be able to provide the networking opportunities and 
act as a catalyst, Interface Structures need to be close to their potential clients and, 
therefore, have to establish a network of geographically dispersed operations. Both 
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the OTRI Network and the DDA have offices all over the national geography, and 
have a system to network their operations. Network is necessary because of the small 
size of the local offices (a few individuals at most, sometimes only one person). 
Customer-led. Interface structures are not clearing houses for technologies and 
capabilities developed in research organisations; in other words their role is not to 
push technologies developed by scientific establishment to new sectors and 
customers. Instead, one of the problems they face is that neither the communities with 
which researchers could establish mutually profitable links have developed and 
articulated their demand for technology, nor the scientists and technicians are aware 
of what could they offer to potential commercial customers. The orientation of the 
interface structure is therefore customer-led: helping companies define and convey 
their technological needs, and helping researchers understand better how their 
capabilities can be used outside their normal practice environment (in our cases 
academic or defence). The DDA, for instance, stimulates technological demand 
through the use of formal analytical tools (their technology audits). The OTRI 
Networks has focused on “educating” researchers on management and commercial 
practices necessary to be able to operate outside the academic environment.  
Individualised approach and “know-who” capacities. To be able to establish and 
strengthen networks at the local and regional level Interface Structures have to 
emphasise personal contacts, and be able to respond to the individual demands of 
specific researchers and potential users and beneficiaries of their technological 
capabilities. For instance, while one of the DDA failed predecessors, Defence 
Technologies Enterprises Ltd., built a database of technologies on offer, the DDA is 
building a database of thousands of contacts in industry and academia, seeing its 
growing network of contacts as one of its main assets. In Spain, although the OTRI 
Network/OTT did not build a centralised contact database, yet it focused a substantial 
part of its activity in providing point of contacts to both industrialists and researchers. 
In practice both organisations develop a “know-who” expertise (OECD 1996) as a 
crucial capacity to support their daily activities. 
Generalist rather than specialised. Traditional technology brokers that operate as 
commercial intermediaries and seek to generate funds from the licensing of 
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technologies and other commercial activities are typically targeted in their operations 
and the set of skills they have to deploy, often focusing in a few technological areas. 
In contrast, Interface Structures have a broader set of goals and activities, will have to 
rely on generalists who are able to generate new personal networks, and will not focus 
on narrow disciplinary or technological specialisations. The networked and customer-
led characteristics of Interface Structures causes them to be involved in a variety of 
transfer and collaborative mechanisms, and of sectors of application and technology 
fields. These call for a flexible technological and sectoral coverage to be able to adapt 
to the needs of the client base, requiring their local representatives to be generalists 
able to network within and across different communities (“know-who”), rather than 
technical or functional specialists. Functional expertise (for instance on legal or 
financial matters) will be provided through the central services (DDA), or through the 
networking activities (OTRI Network).  
Conclusions 
As we have seen in this paper, Interface Structures can emerge in very different 
contexts, but respond to a similar problem: the need to bridge different communities 
and institutions, with different cultures and practices, and which are both unable to 
articulate their technological needs or offerings, and unaware of the capabilities or 
needs the other have. From this perspective the concept of Interface Structure can be 
integrated into a “systems of innovation” framework. From this perspective, the 
problem Interface Structures address is the weakness of the linkages between system 
components; in other words, instead of operating over the components of an 
innovation system, the Interface Structures facilitate the linkages among them. There 
are therefore relevant in situations in which the relationships between elements of the 
innovation system are not occurring spontaneously or fluidly (Polt et al, 2001); that is, 
in systems that lack “articulation” (Fernández de Lucio et al., 2003).  
The roles of an Interface Structure are complex and go far beyond the development of 
an organisation to operate as a conveyor belt for technologies. Their position within a 
System of Innovation will, however, tend to be weak. Without a clear commercial 
orientation Interface Structure require the support of other organisations, which in the 
cases we have analysed are always located within the public sector. The DDA 
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depends on the budgetary support of the Ministry of Defence and relies on the 
assistance of Regional Development Authorities. The OTRI Network was initially 
funded by central government (through the Spanish National R&D Plan) and regional 
authorities. Within this context both organisations can be easily affected by policy 
changes. Pressures to become, for instance, more commercial in their strategies and 
day to day practices would completely change their nature, affecting most if not all of 
the characteristics we have identified in this paper. 6 These pressures are likely to 
develop, particularly as the impacts of Interface Structures are often difficult to 
translate into easy to interpret quantitative indicators and may appear to be vague to 
policy-makers. How does one for instance, can one translate the “strengthening of the 
linkages in an innovation system” into a clear measure of policy impact on social and 
economic welfare? This difficulty to present the rationale for Interface Structures 
through “hard” impact data and using concepts that do not “hang” on complex 
theoretical frameworks (innovation systems) possibly constitutes their main weakness 
today as a policy instrument and explains that their diffusion is still limited.  
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